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ABSTRACT
Recent progress to better understand the environmental
threat of micrometeoroid and space debris to the radiator for the
solar dynamic power system on Space Station Freedom is reported.
The objective has been to define a design which would perform to
survivability requirements over the expected lifetime of the
radiator.
A previous paper described the approach developed to assess
on-orbit survivability of the solar dynamic radiator due to micro-
meteoroid and space debris impacts. Preliminary analyses were
presented to quantify the solar dynamic radiator survivability.
These included the type of particle and particle population
expected to defeat the radiator bumpering. Results of preliminary
hypervelocity impact (HVI) testing performed on radiator panel
samples were also presented.
This paper presents results of a more extensive test program
undertaken to further define the response of the solar dynamic
radiator to HVI. Tests were conducted on representative radiator
panels (under ambient, nonoperating conditions) over a range of
particle size, particle density, impact angle, and impact velocity.
Target parameters were also varied. Data indicate that analytical
penetration predictions are conservative (i.e., pessimistic) for the
specific configuration of the solar dynamic radiator.
Test results are used to define the solar dynamic radiator
reliability with respect to HVI more rigorously. Test data, analy-
ses, and survivability results are presented.
NOMENCLATURE
c.1, coefficient in multishock equation (cm 3-s/km-g)
cn 	coefficient in nonoptimum Whipple shield equation
[kin-g2/3/(s-cros/2)l
cp 	coefficient in radiator extrusion perforation correlation
[km-g/(cm- s)[1 /3
projectile diameter (cm)
d,: 	critical projectile diameter causing failure (cm)
spacing from front wall (bumper) to backwall (extrusion)
(cm)
ES i
 total spacing between first bumper and back wall (cm); that
is, sum of all interplate spacings in multishock shield
configuration.
t2
	back wall or extrusion wall thickness (cm)
V	 impact velocity (km/sec)
V n
 normal impact velocity (km /sec), V n = V cose
P P 	projectile density (g/cm3)
P 1	 facesheet (bumper) density (g/cm 3)
oy2 back wall yield stress (ksi)
0	 impact obliquity angle measured from surface normal (deg)
BACKGROUND
The solar dynamic radiator (SDR) is designed to perform as
the thermal sink for the Closed Brayton Cycle solar dynamic
power system on Space Station Freedom. The solar dynamic
power system and the SDR have been described in detail else-
where.( 14,10 ) A previous paper (13) gave an overview of the
preliminary testing and analyses performed to initially quantify the
probable survivability of the SDR over its lifetime in the orbital
debris environment.
This paper describes further testing and analysis undertaken to
achieve a better understanding of the response of the SDR to the
environmental threat of hypervelocity impact (HVI) from micro-
meteoroids and space debris. This component of space hardware is
unique enough in configuration such that previously developed sur-
vivability prediction techniques cannot provide adequate insight as
to whether the radiator design could meet the required probability
of survival over the 10 year lifetime in low-earth orbit. In addi-
tion, no satisfactory technique existed to evaluate design changes
made to improve radiator protection from orbital debris impacts.
Thus a program of testing and analysis was initiated to ensure
that the survivability requirements could be met.
This particular study focuses upon design of the radiator
panels for survivability under hypervelocity impacts. Survivability
of other radiator components was discussed in the previous paper.
Figure 1 illustrates the configuration of the radiator panels, de-
signed to efficiently reject waste heat from the flow tubes (coolant
passages), through the extruded bumpering around the tubes, and
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Figure 1.-Solar dynamic module radiator panel.
finally to the outer surface, which is coated with a highly emissive
white paint. Paramount to successful radiator operation is main-
tenance of a sealed, and unobstructed, coolant flow path. An
environmental threat to the radiator panels is that hypervelocity
impact from a micrometeoroid or debris particle could puncture a
flow tube. For this reason, among others, the radiator is designed
with an entirely redundant flow path to be used if the primary
flow path cannot function.
The previous paper (13) reported results of a series of 12 HVI
tests performed on SDR panel samples. That test series has been
designated 'phase 1' of the current program. The results pre-
sented herein are referred to as 'phase 2' results.
OBJECTIVES FOR SECOND PHASE OF TESTING
The objective of this study was to refine the phase 1 meteoroid
and debris penetration assessment for the SDR. The phase 2 test
methodology was designed to establish the effect of impact angle
(obliquity) and to characterize the "impact limit" of the flow
tubes within the panels; that is, the impact conditions that just
cause failure (penetration) of the flow tubes. (Failure is defined as
flow tube penetration. "Pinching" of a tube is not considered a
failure as the radiator can continue to operate under this condition
because of the parallel flow configuration.) In addition, protection
benefits associated with an increase in tube wall thickness were
determined. Some limited testing to assess projectile velocity
effects and effects of HVI on the panel coating were also
performed.
SECOND PHASE OF HYPERVELOCITY EVIPACT TESTING
Test Facilitv
As with the first test phase, the NASA Johnson Space Center
(JSC) Hypervelocity Impact Research Laboratory (HIRL) per-
formed the second phase of SDR HVI testing. This study used the
HIRL 4.3 mm gun (launch tube bore diameter) which is capable of
launching 3.2 mm diameter spherical projectiles at 7 km/sec.
Diagnostic data on the tests were obtained by using a high-speed
laser-shadowgraph framing camera. The camera is used to confirm
projectile velocity and integrity, and to provide impact data such
as ejected particle pattern and velocity.(5,12)
Test Articles. Four types of test articles were used for
evaluation in the second phase of HVI testing. These are shown in
Figure 2(a). The test articles contain extruded aluminum now
tubes sandwiched between aluminum honeycomb. This matrix is
bonded between 0.010 in. aluminum facesheets (Fig. 3). Samples 1
2.5 in.
t
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Figure 2A.-Details of Hypervelocity test sample to maximize useful test results.
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Figure 2B.-Test sample extrusion details.
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Figure 3.-Details of SDR panel design (All dimensions in inches;
1 inch = 2.54 CM).
and 2 differ only in the extrusion wall thickness (0.032 in. versus
0.05 in., Fig. 2(b)). As discussed in the phase 1 report, (13) the
configurations of sample types 1 to 3 were selected to increase the
data return from HVI testing by increasing the target size while
maintaining realistic HVI response characteristics. Type 4 samples
-- the baseline SDR configuration -- were used to verify experimen-
tal findings by repeating test conditions. A single side of some of
the type 4 test panels is coated with Z-93 zinc-oxide white paint
(nominally 0.06 in. thick layer); a candidate radiator thermal
coating. This allowed impact evaluation of a potential radiator
thermal coating, albeit under ambient, nonoperating thermal
conditions.
Test Procedure. Test conditions for 33 hypervelocity impact
tests conducted during the second phase of the SDR testing are
given in Table I. The majority of the tests were conducted with
round aluminum projectiles to simulate the density (but not neces-
sarily the shape) of orbital debris. Because meteoroids have a
lower density (0.5 g/cm 3 ), two tests were performed with nylon
spherical projectiles to assess projectile density effects. Projectile
sizes from 1.0 mm to 2.4 mm were used, with obliquity angles
varying up to 75° from the surface normal. All but two tests were
performed with the shot line direction perpendicular (normal) to
the axis of the flow tube; the shot direction of the two exceptions
was parallel to the flow tube.
Figure 4 illustrates the test setup. An aluminum "witness
plate" (typically 0.4 mm A16061-0) was placed 2.5 cm behind the
Figure 4.-Test setup.
TABLE I. - IMPACT CONDITIONS
HIRL Shot
Number
Projectile
	 Diameter
(in M)
Velocity
(km/s)
Impact	 Angle
(degrees)
Pro)ectlle
	
Density
(glcc)
Mass
mgL
Target
Type
Spacing
(nn
Dlrectlon
 1.42 7.0 45 2.0 4.2 Sarn	 Ie	 t 12.3 Normal
A1034 1.59 G.0 45 5.9 5.2
A10 4 0 1.00 G.5 45 1.5 8.7
A1049 1.59 6 4 45 5.9 10.6
A1050 2.30 0.2 45 19.7 Sample 2 0.0
A1051 1.59 6.9 45 5.9 1 0.0
A1052 2.36 6.1 45 19	 7 11.6
A1054 1.59 6.6 45 5.9 Sample 1 13.7
A1056 1.59 6.8 45 5.9 Sam lc 2 5.7
A1057 1.59 6.4 60 5.9 0.3
A1070 2.30 7.0 60 19.7 0.3
A1071 2.00 6.5 60 11.7 Samle	 1 24 4
A1072 2.00 6.6 60 11.1 0.0
A1073 2.00 5.9 60 11.7 27.9
A1075 2.00 6.5 60 11.7 4.2
A1089 2.00 6.5 60 1	 1,7 Sample 2 10.6
A1092 1 .59 6.7 0 5.9 Sample 3 0 0
A1093 1.59 6.9 45 5.9 Sample 3 M Parallel
A1094 2.00 6.0 45 11.7 Sample 4 0 22.2 Normal
A1095 2.00 5.2 45 11.7 Sample 4 IF 9.4
A1096 2.30 6 6 75 19.7 Sample 2 37.0
A1097 2.38 6.0 75 19.7 Sample 1 23.5
A1098 2.30 6.5 45 t.t 8.0 sample 1 10.1
A1099 1.60 6.0 0 2.8 0.5 Sample 3 0.0
At 101 1.00 6.6 45 8.5 Sample 3 0.0 Parallel
At 104 2.00 6.6 45 11.7 Sample 2 5.3 Normal
A1105
 2.00 3.4 45 1	 1 .7 Sam le 1 23.6
At 106 2.00 7.2 45 11.7 24.7
A 1108 2.00 7.0 45 11.7 19.3
A1109
 2.00 G.7 45 1	 1 .7 Sample 2 6.1
Al 185 2.38 5.7 45 1.1 0.0 Sam le 4 F 12.G
At1pG 2.00 6.1 45 2.0 11.7 1.5
A1108 2.00 3.7 45 2.0 11.7 13.2 ^-
'Target hype Note
	
B indicates coating on back and F indicates coating on front (for Sample 4)
test panel to gauge the effects from products of penetration. The
"ejecta catcher" in front of the panel was used to record the
damaging effects of particles ejected from the front surface of the
panel. Typically, the ejecta catcher was 0.3 mm Al 6061-0, but
Al 3003-H12 ejecta catchers up to 0.64 mm thick were used for
some shots, such as the very high obliquity shots, which generated
particularly damaging ejecta.
Test velocities ranged up to 7.8 km/sec. It is estimated that
only about 25 percent of all orbital debris impacts will occur at
8 km/sec or less, but this is currently the highest velocity available
experimentally in the particle range of interest. The average im-
pact velocity for orbital debris at Space Station Freedom altitude
is over 10 km/sec, while average meteoroid velocity is 20 km/sec.
Thus some method is needed to scale the experimental results to
velocities experienced on-orbit. The approach of this study is to
use the lower speed test data to modify existing semi-empirical
models that have been previously developed for dual multiplate
aluminum structures. (1-4) Semi-empirical predictor equations
combine HVI test data with an analytical or theoretical basis for
scaling to higher velocities. But given the complex geometry of
the radiator panels, with internal honeycomb, thick bonding
adhesive layer, and nonparallel surfaces, some adjustment of the
semi-empirical equation parameters become necessary. These
modifications are based on the test data.
Low speed impacts can sometimes be more damaging to
spaced shields because less projectile fragmentation occurs.(1)
Consequently, a few tests were conducted to determine if damage
to the radiator structure at lower velocities is more or less severe.
RESULTS FROM SECOND PHASE OF HVI TESTING
HVI Data
Data on the extent of damage to the radiator panels from the
second phase of HVI testing is listed in Table II. Comments on
the damage to the bumper interior section and flow tube (if appli-
cable) of the extrusion are given. A simple leak check was per-
formed to determine if an extrusion was perforated (completely
penetrated) by filling the extrusion with water under ambient
conditions (unpressurized) and checking for leaks. Perforation is
considered failure. Damage to nonperforated extrusions is
indicated by the extent of closure or "pinching" of the flow tube.
In addition to perforation assessment, general damage to the
facesheet and honeycomb was assessed. Facesheet hole sizes were
measured from the inside of the hole. The front facesheet holes
were generally elliptical with the long axis parallel to the direction
of projectile flight, but became more irregular as obliquity angles
increased. The Z93 white paint partially spalled (that is, it was
ejected by the impact shock) from a small area around the front
facesheet impact hole. The coating spall size was typically 4 to 6
times the diameter of the projectile at the impact conditions
tested. Back facesheet damage given in Table II only indicates the
hole measured at the surface of the panel. Much more extensive
damage occurs to the back facesheet from tearing and petaling of
the facesheet. The honeycomb damage size is a rough measure of
the area of crushed and ejected honeycomb.
Figure 5 shows the result of a 2.38 mm aluminum sphere
impacting at a 60' angle at 6.95 km/sec (HIRL Shot A1070).
Note the small entrance hole on the front sheet and the petalled
hole in the back facesheet. Generally, high obliquity shots had less
rear facesheet petaling; that is, a 45' shot exhibited a larger
petalled area than an equivalent 60' shot. However, the witness
plates mounted behind oblique shots do not have a great deal of
damage. As displayed in Fig. 5, the witness plate is coated with
black powder debris and is severely deformed, but only exhibits a
few fragment impacts that left dimples on the witness back surface
and no perforations. This indicates that the projectile debris that
exited the panel contained no large fragments and produced a pri-
marily impulsive load to the witness plate.
The ejecta catcher plates, on the other hand, had multiple
perforations with many of these concentrated near the surface of
the panel. As demonstrated by comparing the damage patterns in
the ejecta catchers, the damage from secondary ejecta debris in-
creases substantially as impact obliquity angle increases. A
detailed analysis of the ejecta catchers should be performed to
correlate damage extent with impact conditions, and to make
quantitative predictions of the secondary debris hazards to nearby
structures such as the solar dynamic concentrator assembly.
Damage to a coated radiator panel from HVI is given in Fig. 6.
A 2.0 mm aluminum sphere impacting at 45' and 6.83 km/sec
created a petalled hole on the coated facesheet of the rear of the
panel. The coating remained relatively intact, and even adhered
to a large portion of the surface area of the petals in the facesheet.
TABLE II. - TEST ARTICLE DAMAGE MEASUREMENTS
HIRL
Shot Number
Bumper	 In orlor
Dems a
Flow Tube
D... .
Front Fecesheel	 Hole SIZ• Beck Fecesheel 	 Hole Size
Max(mm)
	
m
Min m	
m
Mez m	
m
Min	 m
Honeycomb Hole Slze
Mer m	
m
Min m
coeting	 sp'll
Size	 m	
zNon, N/A 3.6 3.i 14 02 21.Om 100 NIAA! ,
A 1074 sul	 a	 100°:) 4 5 3 4 0 1 0 I 35 5 22 0
A1048 11­ 29 2.5 35 34 90 60
A1049 Nome 4 5 3 5 6 5 3 7 1 8 5 is 5
A 1050 Porloralod 19 0 13 0 0 0 0 0 Not Measured Not Measured I
A1051 Porloralod 12 5 I1.0 V O 00 Nat 1.lnasur ed 1101 IAOasured I
A1052 Perforated 6 6 4 5 4 5 4 0 55 5 33 0
A 1054 Bul 0 (30%) d 3 3 0 4 2 4 2 29 5 1 7 5
A 1056 Bulge (10%) 6 5 1	 d 5 45 5 22 5 Not Measured Not Measured
A 1057 slight Bulge (<10%) 4 8 3 4 0 0 00 22 5 13 0
A1070 Porforated 8 0 5 0 9 0 7 5 42 0 32 5
A1071 Nono 1 1 6 3 4 0 7 0 4 5 22.5 20 0
A1072 Perforated 2 7 2 7 0 0 00 Not W.., u N Noi hi.. ­ d
A1073 Nmo 6 2 4 3 8 5 3 5 23 0 16 5
A 1075 Porloralod 7 5 4 0 6 5 4 0 35 5 22 0
A1089
Bul 0(90%)
6 2 3 9 7 5 4 0 38 0 35 5
A 1092 Porloralod Porloralod 4 B 4 8 0.0 0 0 N/A N/A
A1093 Porloralo0 Nmn 5 2 5 2 1	 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A
A 1091 Bul a	 10% Nano 5 7 4] 3.0 J 0 22 5 17 0 Nmo
A 1096 Por (orated Nmo 5 5 4 0 6 0 4 5 24 5 l3 0 11 5. 90
A1096 Nmo N/A 10 5 4 0 2 5 2 0 26 0 i8 5 NIA
A1097 Nmo 9.5 4 0 5 0 3 5 21	 5 16 0
A1096 But 0
	
30% 5 2 4 J 10 5 J 5 37 0 20 0
A 1099 Per located Porloralod 7 0 6 5 0 0 0 0 N/A N/A
A 1101 Perforated Prnch,d	 1001: 6 5 6 0 0 0 00 N/A N/A
A 1104 Porloralod N/A 0 0 6.5 8.0 7 5 43 0 31 0
A l105 Nmo 4 6 J	 I B 5 4 5 16 5 7 0
A l 106 NpIn 1 6 0 5 0 21	 5 1	 6 5 Not 1.1oasured Not Measured
At 108 Bul 0 (20%) 5 0 1	 3 5 7.5 1	 J 5 35 5 19 0
At 109 Porloralod 5.5 3.5 6 0 6 0 47 5 26 S
/A! !65 Note Nar, 5 7 4 3 10.2 to 2 Not Nk.asurci I Not Measured 11	 d .t0 2
A1106 Perforated None 6 6 5 1 10 7 7 6 Not Wasurod Nol Measured 16 S a	 i2 7
A! 168 Bul 0 (30%) Non, 4 6 3.3 7 6 7 6 Not Measured fret Moasurc0 1	 10 7. 9 7
: Bumper Int,rlor d—tige N,Ie' Bulge (%°^a) - wrb of tube clo g od (es,malod)
'Flow Tube Damage Nole'. Pmched (x 6) closed (estimated)
HIRL shot A1070
Projectile 2.380 mm AI-2017T4
Velocity 6.95 km/sec
Impact angle 60 degrees
u
4 cm
idw
(a) Front of test article. 	 (b) Back of test article.
	
Ejecta catchers, (c) front; (d) back; "unfolded" from test
configuration.
Figure 5.—Example of test article damage
HIRL shot	 A1070	 do = 0.8 {[6/(r pp)] [oy2/4010 t2/ Vn S 2 ) 1/3	 (2)
Projectile	 2.380 mm AI-2017T4
Velocity	 6.95 km/sec	 I or,
Impact angle	 60 degrees	 4 cm
do = CPPP
_
 1/3V-1/3S2/3t21/3 [ 0, Y2 /40] 1/6 	(3)
Particle	 ^— Particle
entrance•-^	
—	
exit
Front
	 Back
(a) Front of test article. 	 (b) Back of test article
Figure 6.—Example of damage to coated test article.
HVI Analysis. A penetration correlation for the flow tubes
was developed from the phase 2 HVI data on the extrusions. This
correlation is based on a modification of the multishock equation
given in Ref. 2,
	
d o = { 1/C [ 6/(- p p )J 10 ,2/40 ] '/2 t2/ Vn( ES i) 2 1' /3	 (1)
The use of this equation is based on the assumption that the
damage sustained by the extrusion is primarily due to an impul-
sive load from the projectile debris, and not primarily from frag-
ment damage. One of the main reasons for using this equation is
the multishock configuration of an oblique impact directed through
the honeycomb. Because the geometry of the radiator panels is
different than the multishock shield configurations which were used
to derive the coefficient, C, of Eq. (1), this aspect of the equation
was modified based on the test results. The modified Cour-Palais
multishock equation to be used as the predictor equation for criti-
cal particle size causing radiator tube failure was derived as:
where C  is 0.993 (g-km/(cm3_S)) 1/3
This equation predicts the particle size causing perforation of
the extrusion wall. Particles that do not fail the extrusion can still
cause "bulging" or "pinching" of the tube wall or other damage
to the interior of the extrusion, although the radiator can continue
to operate under these conditions. To prevent any damage to the
extrusion interior, the coefficient in Eq. (3) should be decreased by
Cp = 0.68 (g-km /cm3-s)1/3.
Evidence to support use of a modified multishock equation
includes the primarily impulsive load damage observed on the
witness plates mounted behind the panels, and the impulsive load
type damage (bulging) observed in the extrusions. The nonperfo-
rating damage to the extrusions was manifested in a deformation
or bulge that extended into the now element. No obvious crater-
ing or dimpling from fragment damage was noticeable from the
optical examinations of the extrusions.
For small obliquity angles, from 0° to approximately 15°, the
projectile will penetrate through a single bumper. Thus, a Cour-
Palais Whipple shield predictor (4) was used for determining the
critical particle size causing tube failure:
d o = Cn pp 1/2p1 1/6 V 1S1/2t 2[ay2/40 1 1/2 ,	 (4)
where the coefficient C n was modified from experimental results
and was found to be 34 km-g2/3 /(s-cm' 2 ) to prevent tube failure.
Tables III and IV contain the results from applying Eqs. (2)
and (4) to predict the critical particle size for each of the phase 2
HVI data shots. Equation (2) parameters, such as spacing and
obliquity angle, as well as miss distance, are defined in Fig. 7.
The difference between actual projectile diameter and calculated
critical diameter (d 	 dc ) to fail the radiator extrusion and flow
tube is also given. W hen this difference is positive, perforation of
the extrusion is predicted. If negative, perforation is not expected,
but damage in the form of bulging or pinching without perforation
can occur.
TABLE III. - CRITICAL PARTICLE DIAMETER FOR BUMPER DAMAGE
IfIRL
Shot Number
Pro lac ill•	 Density
/cc
Beck-11
	 Yield
Strength	 (kal)
Backwall
Thickness	 mm
Vnorm
km/e
Spacing
mm
Critical	 Diameter	 (dc)
mm
Projectile	 Diameter	 (dp) dp - do
mm
Bumper	 Interior
D.M.Q.
A1033 2 0 36 0 61 5.5 12 3 1 95 1 a2 -0 53 Non.
A1034 4 2 5 2 1 20 1 59 0.39 B,d 9	 100%1
At048 4.6 0 7 1.54 1.00 -0 64 None
A1049 4 5 18 6 2 74 159 I	 15 Noe
A1050 44 00 Not	 Calculated 238 N/A Perloralod
A1051 4 6 0 0 Not	 Calculated 1 59 N/A Perforated
A1052 1 27 4.3 11	 6 2.36 2.38 0.02 Perforated
A1054 0 01 4 6 13 7 2.21 1	 59 -0 62 Bulge
	 30%
A1056 1	 27 4 8 5 7 1	 41 1 59 0 18 Bulge
	 10Y.
A1057 1 3 2 8 3 2 09 1 59 -0 50 $II	 hl	 Bulge
	 X10
A1070 7 5 8.3 2 03 2.36 0 35 Perforated
A1071 Oat 32 24.4 368 200 168 Nan
A1072 11 3 3 0.0 Not	 Calculated 2 00 N/A Portordted
A1073 30 27.9 413 200
-2	 13 Nan
A1075 3 3 4 2 1	 14 2 00 0 as Porlorated
A1009 1 27 33 106 2.14 200 044 But a	 90::1
A1092 0171 67 00 plot	 Calculated 1 59 NIAI Perforated
A 1003 49 00 1	 Nol	 CalculalnJ 1 5 9 N/A P.r lorawd
A 1094 4 a 22.2 3 01 2 00 I	 O 1 OUI	 0	 10'.:
A1095 3 7 9 4 1	 70 2 00 0.13 Parlor aced
A1096 1 27 1	 7 37 0 f 96 2 30 -4	 5-ol Nan
A1097 0	 111 1	 6 23 5 4 39 2.30 2 Oil Nor.
A1098 11 d 5 10	 1 2.46 2 38 0 00 Bul oJ30Y.
A 109'3 211 6.8 00 Not Gaicutwed 1 00 N/A Perforaled
Al 101 \ / 4 7 0.0 Not Calculamd 1 00 N/A Perforated
At t04 1 27 4 7 5 3 1	 35 2.00 0 55 Porlorat.d
A 1105 0 01 2 4 23 6 3 95 2 00 1 .951 Nor.
Al I OG 5. t
	 1 24 7	 1 3 19 2 00 vi	 1 9 Ilan
5.0 19 J 2 12 2 DO 0 72 Bul a	 20 Y
1	 27 4 0 O I 1 00 200 0 20 Parlor dead
S
11
 11 0ni 40 126 2.97 23B .0.59
2.0 4 3 1	 5 NotCalculated 2 00 NIA Perloraied
 2.6 2 G 1 3 2 2,62 2 00	 1 0 621 Bu1ne	 30r,,
'Bumpor Interior Damago Nato : Bulge (x%) - x:: closed astimatno)
TABLE IV. - CALCULATED VERSUS ACTUAL PARTICLE DIAMETER FOR FLOW TUBE DAMAGE
HIRL
Shot Number
Projectile
Density
/cc
Beckwell
Yield
Stren	 Ih	 ksl)
Soekwall
Thickness
mm
Vnorm
(km/3)
Spacing
mm
Critical
Diameter	 Inc)
mm
Projectile
Diameter	 (do)
mm
rip - do
mm
Ml's
Distance
mm
Flow
Tube
Dame e
A1092 2.8 36 0.81 6.7 5.5 1.07 1.59 0.52 0.00 Perforaled
A1093 2.0 36 0.01 4.9 5.5 1.19 1,59 0.40 0.00 1	 None
A1094 2.8 36 0.94 4 8 22.2 3.11 2.00 .1.17 9.02 1	 None
A1095 2.8 1	 36 0.94 3.7 9.4 1.96 2.00 0.04 0.03 None
A1099 2.8 1	 36 0.81 6.8 5.5 1.07 1.80 0.73 0.00 Perforated
A1101 2.8 i	 36 0.81 4.7 5.5 1.21 1.00 0.59 0.00 Pinched Itoo 6
.A1185 1.1 36 0.94 4,0 12.6 3.12 2.38 -0.74 2.23 None
A1186 2.8 36 0.01 4.3 5 5 1.21 2.00 0.761 4 62 None
At 188 2.8 36 0.94 2.6 1	 13.2	 1 2.75 2.00 0.75 2.66 None
Flow Tube Damage Note : Pinched (x%) - x% closed (estimated)
S = spacing: length from front facesheet to the extrusion along
the line of flight.
Lm = miss distance between actual line of flight and line of flight
to center of extrusion/flow tube.
O = obliquity angle of impact.
Figure 7.-Definition of parameters for equation 2
METEOROID AND DEBRIS HAZARD ANALYSIS
The semi-empirical equations based on the experimental results
were used to perform an assessment of the probability of failure of
the radiator panel flow tubes from meteoroids and orbital debris.
Equations (2) and (4) were used to predict the critical particle size
causing complete penetration of the flow tube as a function of ob-
liquity angle for both a thin wall (0.032 in. or 0.8 mm) and thick
wall (0.05 in. or 1.3 mm) extrusion. The results are plotted for
the thin wall extrusion in Fig. 8 for both meteoroid and debris
particles impacting at average velocities of 20 and 10 km/sec,
respectively. A similar plot of the thick wall results showed only
slightly increased resistance to penetration.
Current Debris Environment
An estimate of the number of impacts from orbital debris and
meteoroids on the radiator panel tubes that are large enough to
cause failure of the baseline 0.032 in. flow tube extrusion over
10 year period is given in Table V. These data are based on a
total flow tube area of 24.78 m 2 . The numbers were calculated
using the currently baseline space station orbital debris (6) and
meteoroid (11) environments. Impact rates from critical particle
sizes at both a 400 km (215 nm) operational altitude and the
500 km (270 nm) maximum altitude specified in space station
design requirements, (11) are indicated. Table V shows that at
the 500 km maximum altitude, the probability of no-failure of
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Figure 8.-Particle size causing radiator tube failure.
TABLE V. - METEOROID AND DEBRIS IMPACTS CAUSING FAILURE OF THE SOLAR DYNAMIC
RADIATOR PANEL TUBES WITH THIN WALL EXTRUSION
(Thin Wall (0.032 in.) Extrusion, Life: 10 years.)
Radiator case Surface
Area,
m'
All.,
km
Critical
particle flux.
Impects/m'-yr
Number of critical
Impacts over life
Probability
of
nofallure
Debris Met. Debris Met Combined
Single-bop 12.39 500 5.13x10' 2.37x10' 0.064 0.029 0.093 0.911
Einar loop (wilhoul 24.78 500 5.13.10' 2.37x10' .127 .059 .186 .831	 .
redundancy)
Both bops (with 24.78 500 ....... ....... ----- ----- .008 .992
redundancy)
Single-bop 12.39 400 1.82x10' 2.31x10' .022 029 .051 .950
Either loop (without 24.78 400 1.82x10' 2.31x10' 045 .057 .102 .903
redundancy)
Both bops (with 24.78 400 - -..... ------ - .... --- .002 .9975
redundancy)
TABLE VI. - METEOROID AND DEBRIS IMPACTS CAUSING FAILURE OF THE SOLAR DYNAMIC
RADIATOR PANEL TUBES WITH THICK WALL EXTRUSION
(Thick Wall (0.05 in.) Extrusion. Life: 10 years.)
Radiator case Surface
Area,
M,
Aft.,
km
Critical
particle flux,
Impacts(m'-yr
Number of critical
Impacts over life
Probability
of
no-failure
Debris Met. Debris Met Combtried
Single-bop 12.39 500 4.72x10' 2.21x10' 0.058 0027 0.086 0.918
Either loop (without 24.78 500 4.72x10' 2.21x10' .117 .055 .172 .842
redundancy)
Both bops (with 24.78 500 ....... ....... ----- ..... .007 .993
redundancy)
Single-bop 12.39 400 1.67x10' 2.15x10' .021 ,029 .047 .954
Either loop (without 24.78 400 1.67x10' 2.15x10' .041 .053 .095 .910
redundancy)
Both bops (with 24.78 400 ------- ....... ..... ----- .002 .9979
redundancy)
either of the two loops from orbital debris and meteoroids is 0.83
over 10 years (i.e., there is one chance in six that one of the two
loops in each SDR system will fail in 10 years). This was cal-
culated from the individual probability of no-failure of the primary
and secondary loops which are both 0.91 over 10 years (i.e.,
0.91 2 = 0.83). The chance that both primary and secondary loops
in a SDR system will fail from meteoroids and debris over 10 years
is less than 0.8 percent (i.e., 1 - 0.9921). Thus the current design
meets the current SDR design requirements.
Similar calculations can be made for the thick walled (0.05")
extrusion as given in Table 6. In this case, the probability of
failure of an individual loop increases to 0.92 over 10 years at
500 km, which results in an increase to 0.84 of the probability of
either loop failing and 0.933 of both loops failing.
More detailed results showing the probability contribution as
a function of obliquity angle will be published later this year by
the authors.
Sensitivity to Debris Environment. An updated orbital debris
environment has been developed from the latest ground-based mea-
surements and returned spacecraft materials.(7) This updated
environment is more severe in terms of potential damage than the
debris environment (6) currently used for space station design.
Adoption of the new debris environment definition is pending final
space station approval. Recent activities on the part of the
international community in reducing the incidence of catastrophic
satellite breakups has resulted in a reduction in the predicted
growth of the small debris particle population.(§) Currently, a 2
percent per year growth in the small debris particle population is
projected (Kessler, personal communication) versus the 10 percent
promulgated in the Kessler, 1989 debris environment definition.
SDR survivability can be significantly affected by the expected
growth in the debris environment. The single loop probability of
no-failure for the thin wall extrusion (0.032") drops to 0.83 over
the 10 years from 2001 to 2010, and to 0.80 from 2011 to 2020.
The probability of no failure of either loop drops to 0.69 over 2001
to 2010 and to 0.64 over 2011 to 2020. Probability of failure of
both loops becomes 0.97 over 2001 to 2010 and 0.96 over 2011 to
2020.
Discussion of Analysis Assumptions. Several assumptions were
made in the penetration assessment analysis that make the calcula-
tions conservative (worst case). These include:
(1) Worst case orientation of the oblique impacts was
assumed; i.e., perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the flow
tube.
(2) No account was made for added resistance to penetration
of the small diameter flow tube relative to the same thickness flat
plate.
(3) No account was made for shadowing from the debris and
meteoroid flux by the solar dynamic concentrator and other nearby
equipment during part of the orbital period.
(4) Recent thermal design optimization of the SDR has
reduced the number of panels and number of tubes per panel.
Thus the vulnerable area used in these calculations is larger (by at
least 15 percent) than that currently expected on-orbit.
Other assumptions tend to increase the uncertainty of the
analysis. These include:
(1) The exposed area is equal to the total outside surface area
of the flow tubes. This assumption implies that any particle whose
original flight line does not intersect with the flow tube will not
fail the tube. however, because of the expansion of the debris
cloud behind the face sheet, there is a finite probability that a
large enough impact occurring on the radiator panel surface can
fail a flow tube even if it would not have originally intersected
with it. On the other hand, shielding of the SDR by other space
station components was also not accounted for.
(2) The actual debris impact angle and velocity distributions
encountered by the SDR during on-orbit operations was not ac-
counted for. Average debris velocity and random impact angle
assumptions were made in the penetration assessment given in
this paper.
(3) The impact response of the flow tubes under HVI testing
conditions (i.e., near vacuum - 150 µm pressure, and ambient
temperature) versus that of actual on-orbit operating conditions
has not been assessed.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
A series of 33 hypervelocity impact tests have been performed
in a second phase of testing on representative solar dynamic
radiator panel elements to complement test results from more
limited first phase testing.
Using current Space Station environment models. (6.11) the
panel tubes in the baseline solar dynamic radiator system have a
0.992 reliability (with redundancy) from failure by meteoroid and
debris impacts over 10 years. For a single loop, the calculated
radiator probability of no-penetration due to hypervelocity impact
is 0.83 over 10 years (i.e., 17 percent chance of penetration).
For the updated debris environment (7) with a 2 percent small
debris growth rate, the baseline solar dynamic radiator panels have
0.97 probability of no-penetration with redundancy from meteoroid
and debris impact over the 10 year period 2001 to 2010. For a
single loop, the probability of penetration due to hypervelocity
impact is 31 percent.
Increasing the extrusion wall thickness from 0.032 to 0.050 in.
provided a very limited increase in protection. Lower velocity
tests did not show increased damage when compared to equivalent
tests at higher velocities.
The radiator system is made up of more than just the panel
tubes. The reliability of the radiator panel interconnect lines and
other subsystems exposed to the meteoroid and debris environment
should be assessed in a similar hypervelocity impact test and/or
analysis procedure, and the results included in an overall
assessment of the radiator system reliability.
The second phase of tests has demonstrated that less damage
(greater survivability) is observed under HVI test than predicted
by available analytical models for the configuration under study.
Thus, even limited testing is of value for development of some
space hardware.
The HVI test methodology developed for the SDR has been
applied to other space station hardware, such as the photovoltaic
radiators. Data recorded on damage to aluminum honeycomb is
currently being assessed for application to other space station
hardware.
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